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Abstract
A phenomenological approach to understanding individuals’ experience of
imagery when performing a memory and a problem-solving task was employed
in an attempt to understand the complexity of individuals’ experience of
imagery. In Study 1, 24 male and 24 female undergraduates performed either
a paired-associate learning task or completed the Monster Problem and wrote
descriptions concerning the experience of imagery associated with each task.
A questionnaire was developed using items obtained from these descriptions,
and in Study 2, the questionnaire was administered to 51 female and 53 male
undergraduate students. In a within-subjects design, each participant completed
both tasks separated by at least five days. Order of task was counterbalanced
across participants. Factor analyses were performed to determine the
similarities and differences in the structure of imagery when experienced within
a memory task as compared to a problem-solving task. Results indicated
different factor structures for imagery depending upon the cognitive task.
Implications for the development of self-report measures that possess greater
construct and predictive validity than currently existing measures are discussed.
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The Experience of Visual Imagery in Relation to
Memory and Problem-solving
In past decades individuals such as Galton, Titchener, Wundt, Freud,
and Piaget have speculated about the process and content of mental imagery.
Yet, the study of mental imagery is a relative newcomer to the field of
experimental psychology. Because imagery is a type of internal cognitive
representation, it escapes direct observation and, therefore, poses complications
for traditional experimental psychology. Fortunately, researchers are beginning
to realize the necessity of developing new methods by which to study internal
mediating events as directly as possible (Marks, 1985; Ward, 1985; Yuille,
1985).
A broad definition of an image is a "perception in the absence of an
external stimulus" (Gordon, 1972). The reporting of visual imagery appears to
be a universal phenomenon (Gordon, 1972; Holt, 1972), but the study of
imagery is constrained by the difficulty of introspection upon and
communication of experiences of mental imagery. Gordon (1972) suggests that
researchers have discovered only a few of the broadest qualities of imagery
such as rigidity/flexibility, dimensionality, and vividness. Forisha (1978)
concludes that one of the explanations for inconsistent and inconclusive
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relationships reported between imagery and abilities, such as creativity, is the
failure of researchers to consider the complexity of imaginal processes. These
assertions point to the need for a method by which to investigate the
multidimensionality of conscious imaginal processes.
Most imagery research is characterized by procedures that include the
completion of spatial tasks (Shepard & Cooper, 1982) and/or imagery ability
measures (Kosslyn, 1975). Often these tasks are accompanied by self-report
measures. Evidence suggests that spatial tasks, imagery ability measures, and
self-report measures are measuring different phenomena. Forisha (1975) factor
analyzed a battery of tests assessing verbal ability, spatial test performance,
imagery ability performance, and self-report measures of vividness and control
of imagery in children. Each type of measure loaded on a separate factor -Verbal Ability, Spatial Ability, Imagery Ability and Self-report. Divesta,
Ingersoll, & Sunshine (1971) discovered a similar pattern for adults. Ernest
(1977) concludes that although self-ratings and spatial tests load separately,
these self-report measures and spatial ability measures may not be completely
unrelated. He contends that the assumption by researchers that a linear
relationship exists among these abilities and the application of statistical tests
that assume linearity may obscure existing nonlinear relationships.
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Alternatively, assumptions made by researchers as to the qualities of imagery
that are worthy of empirical inquiry restrict the qualities of imagery that are
presently investigated. These restrictions may lead to the development of selfreport measures that fail to assess the multidimensional nature of imaginal
experiences, further inhibiting the identification of relationships among selfreport and performance measures.
It remains to be demonstrated that imagery is synonymous with spatial
skill, and therefore, operationalizing imagery ability via spatial tasks is
premature. The use of such narrow, idiosyncratic operational definitions of
imagery will lead to an increasing number of uninterpretable results. Until
evidence reveals a justification for combining self-report and performance
measures, it must be assumed that subjective reports provide a unique source of
information and are necessary to a complete understanding of the nature of
imagery.
Researchers who include both self-report and behavioral observation
measures often find a discrepancy between data obtained from observation and
data obtained from self-report (Ernest, 1977; Forisha, 1975; Kaufmann, 1981;
Suler & Rizziello, 1987). Such evidence seems to confirm the lack of validity
of self-report measures and appears to support the advocates of observational

Imagery, memory, and

6
methods who question the value of self-report measures (Kosslyn, 1980).
Close scrutiny of the procedures used in studies in which discrepancies
between self-report and behavioral indices are obtained reveals that existing
self-report measures may be used incorrectly. For example, Shaw (1985) used
composite scores of two self-report measures, one developed to measure
vividness and the other intended to measure control of movement. This
combination of data without documented justification ignores the complexity of
imaginal processes and inaccurately assesses the structure and function of
mental imagery. As a result, any corroboration between behavioral and selfreport data may have been obscured by this inadequate procedure.
Also, Suler and Rizziello (1987) combined scores for performance
measures of spatial ability and self-report measures of vividness (as well as
other questions assessing dimensions of imagery assumed by the experimenter
to be important to the experience of imagery). Not surprisingly, the index of
imagery ability derived from the combination of behavioral and self-report data
failed to relate to behavioral indicators of creativity. Only when the single
question assessing vividness of imagery was included in the analyses was a
significant positive relationship found between vividness and creativity. These
findings demonstrate that it is inappropriate at this point in the development of
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imagery research to combine self-report and behavioral data believed to be
indicators of imaginal processing in order to produce one index of imagery
ability.
Some researchers deny the usefulness of subjective reports of imagery
to the understanding of imaginal processes (Kaufman, 1981, 1983; Neisser,
1982) and point to the failure of self-report to provide information about
underlying mechanisms associated with imagery (Richardson, 1985). Yuille
(1985) emphasizes that often psychologists refrain from questioning the
appropriateness of the experimental method in gaining an understanding of
human behavior and experience, and that they refuse to acknowledge the
complementarity of other empirical approaches to experimental methodology.
As Doob (1972) emphasizes, researchers who wish to study imagery
must investigate images that are either reported by subjects or images that are
inferred by the experimenter from observable motor responses in a task
situation or inferred from physiological responses. Researchers who favor
performance measures of imagery infer the underlying mechanisms based upon
behavioral data. In the absence of this additional interpretation by the
researcher, the objective data based upon performance measures is a
description of the performance of the participant, whether or not the
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description is called explicitly a description of experience. The only difference
between behavioral and self-report data is that behavioral observation in the
form of performance measures provides a description of performance and data
obtained from self-report data provide a description of experience, and neither
of these procedures directly reveal underlying mechanisms for the
phenomenon.
Working under the assumption that self-report measures can contribute
in a meaningful way to the understanding of the experience of imagery, it is
only necessary that individuals be aware of their conscious experience.
Instead of tying imagery to particular observational techniques or methods via
task performance, it may be beneficial, as a first step, to begin with
experiential data collected in different situations in order to gain an
understanding of the structure, function, and process of imagery that most
accurately reflects the experience of the individual.
At least three problems exist within imagery research that relate to the
validity of self-report measures. These problems prohibit a fundamental
understanding of the structure and function of imaginal processes. One, selfreport measures of imagery have been developed based upon the
presuppositions of experimenters who have made assumptions regarding the
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qualities of imagery worthy of empirical inquiry. Two, the procedure for
establishing reliability and validity of currently used self-report measures is
methodologically flawed. Three, the study of imagery needs to be removed
from the context of memory in order to understand the complexity of the
structure and function of imaginal processes.
The first fundamental problem within imagery research is that
researchers have neglected to collect standardized anecdotal data on which to
build a questionnaire of imagery that most directly reflects individuals’
experience. The failure to engage individuals more directly in the development
of self-report measures may lead to the measurement of constructs that are
unrelated or only moderately related to the internal experience of imagery. As
a result, existing questionnaires may have been based on constructs that are
unrelated to the internal experiences that mediate the behavior. Measuring
imagery with scales of questionable validity could measure reliably a
phenomenon that does not accurately reflect the concept of imagery as
experienced by individuals.
Introspection in the study of imagery is emphasized by Richardson
(1985) as being an essential part of understanding imagery. Richardson (1985)
advocates the use of existing standardized questionnaires, however, as a means
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by which to obtain an accurate measure of the experience of imagery and
argues that current self-report measures provide an adequate solution to the
problem of describing experiential data in an acceptable and objective form.
Given the inconsistent findings in studies that employed frequently used
measures of imagery (see Ernest, 1977; Forisha, 1975; Kaufmann, 1981), the
continued use of current standardized measures as a means by which to assess
the experience of imagery should be questioned.
Alternative methodological approaches to investigating cognitive
processes which begin at the level of human experience could help to verify the
existence or qualities of internal events. To ensure the validity of findings
related to mental imagery, a refined, systematic methodology is needed to
investigate mental imagery as it is experienced by individuals. Hypothesized
dimensions of imagery would then be validated by reports of human experience
and dimensions not yet hypothesized by researchers would be identified
through these reports. The constructs found to be internal mediators could
then be transformed into a structured measure and studied in relationship to
observable behavior. Such a methodology could contribute to a greater
understanding of the use of imagery when performing cognitive tasks and the
use of imagery in everyday life.
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A second problem in the measurement of imagery is proposed by
Kaufman (1981, 1983) who argues that the reliability and validity of the Vivid
Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) (Marks, 1972, 1973) has been assessed
inadequately. The VVIQ is a 16-item measure and is a shortened version of
Betts’ (1909) Questionnaire upon Mental Imagery that measures imagery in
seven sensory modalities. The VVIQ measures vividness of visual imagery by
asking participants to rate four scenes on a 5-point scale according to the
degree of vividness experienced two times, one time with eyes open, and the
second time with eyes closed.
Although the VVIQ has been found to have high reliability within
subjects, self-report measures do not correlate significantly with task
performance in between-subject comparisons (Kaufmann, 1981, 1983). For
example, introspective reports have been found to predict performance within
subjects and between stimulus items, but not between subjects and within
stimulus items (Marks, 1972; Sheehan, 1966; Sheehan & Neisser, 1969). One
explanation for this pattern of results could be the implementation of a
between-subjects design used to develop measures of subjective experience
(Kaufmann, 1981, 1983). A person can judge if one stimulus item produces a
more vivid image than another item, but he or she cannot make an absolute
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judgement about that experience (Richardson, 1980). Because an absolute
criterion does not exist with which to compare one’s own imaginal experience,
unsystematic errors occur in between-subject analyses. Individuals have had
little experience in making ratings on a rating scale concerning their internal
experiences and are likely to vary in the way they use a Likert scale to rate
their subjective experience. This problem exists when any judgement is made
using a Likert-type scale. Consequently, Kaufmann (1981, 1983) asserts that a
within-subjects design would be most sensitive to demonstrating the validity
and reliability of self-report measures as long as each individual is consistent in
his/her usage of the scale. Kaufmann (1981) contends that as a result of this
procedural flaw, researchers who use the VVIQ to assess the degree to which a
score on the VVIQ is predictive of memory performance find positive results
because of the artificially inflated reliability of the VVIQ instead of the
accurate assessment of vividness that the scale is purported to measure. Other
scales that have been developed using between-subject designs may be
inadequate assessments of imagery as well.
Finally, a third problem in the study of imagery is that most of what is
known about imagery has been learned within the context of memory task
performance in which the question of interest has been: Does imagery
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facilitate recall performance? (Carrier, Karbo, Kindem, Legisa, & Newstrom,
1983; Carigilia-Bull & Pressley, 1990; Guttentag, 1984; Leighbody Alsum,
Tsao, & Evans, 1984; Marks, 1977; Pressley, Cariglia-Bull, & Deane, 1987).
Particularly, the findings on imagery cited by Richardson (1985) include
research investigating imagery within the context of memory or mnemonic
instruction (Paivio, 1972; Paivio, Smythe, & Yuille, 1968; Paivio & Yuille,
1969). By tying the process of imagery to memory tasks, studies focusing on
memory fail to contribute to the understanding of the complexity of imagery.
Imagery must be examined in contexts other than that of memory task
performance in order to understand the complexity of imaginal structures and
processes. As Ahsen (1985) explains, an image is not synonymous with
memory, but it is a symbolic representation of cognitive processing.
Associating imagery with memory to the extent that it is studied exclusively
within a context of memory will lead to the confusion of imagery with
memory. This association of imagery with memory will impede the
understanding of imagery which is a process with its own properties (Ahsen,
1985). Memory is viewed by Kaufmann (1985) as being encompassed by
problem-solving, which is a more general cognitive activity. Kaufmann (1985)
defines imagery as a type of symbolic representation and asserts that the center

Imagery, memory, and

14
of cognition intersects at the joining of problem-solving and symbolic
representation; therefore, studying imagery in problem-solving tasks could
reveal complexities of a general cognitive processing mechanism that remain
unrevealed in the study of imagery in relation to memory performance.
Imagery has been studied by a few researchers as a symbolic
representation outside of the context of memory and has been found to be an
important component of the creative process (Campos & Perez, 1989; Forisha,
1978; Kaufmann, 1979, 1981; Khatena, 1978, 1983, 1984; Parrott &
Strongman, 1985; Rhodes, 1981; Shaw, 1985; Shaw & DeMers, 1986; Shaw
& DeMers, 1987; Suler & Rizziello, 1987; Torrence, 1972; Torrence &
Khatena, 1969). In many of these studies, the processes of creativity and
problem-solving were considered to be synonymous and the evaluation of these
processes included a variety of divergent and convergent thinking tasks. Only
two studies approximated an analysis of the structure and function of imagery
as it relates to problem-solving. McCormick and Mouw (1983) tested Piaget’s
theory of subsystem interaction in problem-solving with graduate and
undergraduate students. A subsystems interaction is the interaction between the
ability to reproduce static images of objects in a problem and the ability to
anticipate transformations of that image. The results indicated that the ability
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to produce static images and to anticipate image transformations accounted for
a significant amount of variance in problem-solving ability, thereby revealing
at least two properties of imaginal processes important to successful problem
solving.
A second study by Cooper (1990) demonstrated that when observers are
asked to solve spatial problems involving flat, disconnected projections,
subjects constructed mental images consisting of integrated, three-dimensional
objects instead of disconnected, flat objects. Evidence that subjects constructed
an image with these qualities was inferred from the subjects’ superior
recognition performance for three dimensional integrated objects presented after
the problem-solving task which had never been seen before by the subjects.
Aside from these two investigations, the primary question of interest
among most researchers has been: how can imagery facilitate creativity and
problem-solving skills? This approach to the study of imagery indicates that
the question of the nature of imagery is assumed to be adequately answered by
previous research; however, it is necessary to discover the dimensions of
imagery that best facilitate the type of reasoning required to solve a particular
problem before attempting to foster problem-solving skills.
Current Measures of Visual Imagery
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Three questionnaires used frequently to assess imagery are the
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (Marks, 1972, 1973) discussed
above, Sheehan’s (1967) modification of Bett’s (1909) Questionnaire upon
Mental Imagery (QMI), and Gordon’s (1949) Test of Visual Imagery Control
(TVIC). Sheehan (1967) based his questionnaire on the pool of 120 items
from the Betts scale and generated a revised 35-item scale that assesses the
extent to which individuals can voluntarily manipulate their mental images in
each of seven sensory modalities. The questionnaire consists of items that
measure control of imagery such as, "Can you see a man standing at the
baseline of a tennis court about to make his first serve?" and "Can you see the
same man in the same place but now dressed in red bathing trunks?"
Questions from Gordon’s TVIC require a "yes" or "no" response to
questions which include: Can you see a car standing in front of a garden gate?
What is its color? Try to see it in a different color. Can you see the car
running along the road? Can you see it climb up a very steep hill? Can you see
it get out of control and crash through a house?
That the W IQ is an inadequate measure of imagery vividness has been
argued by Kaufmann (1981, 1983). Kaufmann’s (1981, 1983) criticisms are
based upon the previously discussed methodological flaws in the development
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of the VVIQ that may lead to artificially inflated reliability coefficients.
Kaufmann’s (1981) criticisms have been rebutted, albeit superficially, by
Marks (1983). In his rebuttal, Marks (1983) emphasizes that significant
within-subject effects but nonsignificant between-subject effects obtained for
the relationship between imagery ability and recall for pictures could be a
function of the multimodality of the Betts QMI in that vividness ratings are
required for seven sensory modalities. Marks (1983) points out that the studies
in which these effects have been obtained presented only visual stimuli, thereby
reducing the validity of the ratings. Also, Marks (1983) suggests that the
meaningfulness of the visual stimulus could influence the extent to which
individual participants are interested in or experience a particular affect as a
result of viewing the stimulus. Tasks that present uninteresting visual stimuli
such as geometric shapes may deflate the interest or affective value of the
stimulus. This confound could eliminate between-subject effects for recall and
vividness of imagery. Finally, Marks (1983) argues that the within-subjects
effects may be a function of demand characteristics and that ratings of
vividness should be obtained prior to the recall task instead of following the
task. This procedure would minimize the extent to which participants’
successful performance on the task motivates them to provide high vividness
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ratings that they believe are expected by the researcher.
According to Kaufmann (1981, 1983), none of these arguments
provides an adequate account for the pattern of results obtained using
subjective vividness ratings. Instead, Kaufmann (1981) proposes that
inappropriate designs used in the development of imagery scales may be
contributing to the absence of between-subject effects in the relationship
_between vividness of imagery and recall performance.
Another debate exists among researchers as to the construct and
predictive validity of the W IQ (Charma, 1988; Marks, 1989a; Charma, 1989;
Charma & Hamm, 1989). Marks (1989b) has compiled an extensive
bibliography of the VVIQ that, according to Marks (1989a), provides strong
evidence for the construct validity of the W IQ . Nevertheless, the fact that the
VVIQ often fails to correlate with memory across a variety of recall and
recognition tasks must be acknowledged (Dickel & Slack, 1983; Chara &
Hamm, 1989; Cohn & Saslona, 1990).
Although this debate will undoubtedly continue, it seems that other
qualities of imagery need to be considered when labeling individuals according
to their imagery abilities. For example, a vivid, complex image may inhibit
effective problem-solving, but a vivid, complex image may facilitate memory
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performance, or vice versa. In this case not only the vividness of the image
but the complexity of that vivid image should be assessed. Marks (1972) has
emphasized also that even "poor" visualizers (as defined by an obtained score
on the VVIQ) have the potential to produce mental images and to use them
effectively under certain conditions. Therefore, the goal of researchers should
be to determine the qualities other than vividness that characterize imaginal
processes in order to determine how these abilities interact with cognitive
processing demands.
Research indicates that Gordon’s TVIC and the W IQ correlate
significantly with one another and confusion exists as to the construct these
scales are measuring (Shaw & Demers, 1987; Ernest, 1977). The W IQ ,
QMI, and TVIC purport to measure unidimensional constructs, but evidence
suggests that these measures may measure complex, multidimensional qualities
of experience. Early factor analyses revealed that the dimensions of vividness
and control load on the same factor in the study of imagery (see Richardson,
1972), and Richardson (1969) provides evidence that vividness and control of
movement of mental images covary in the mental practice of motor
performance. Other researchers found an underlying multidimensional
structure to the control of images, a construct that was previously believed to
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be unidimensional (White and Ashton, 1977). Factor analyses showed that
control consisted of dimensions labeled Movement, Color, Stationary and
Misfortune (the latter factor reflecting a negative event subjects were requested
to imagine during the task). These findings reflect the complex nature of
imagery and indicate a need to explore the dimensions of imagery using
participant generated qualities of imagery instead of investigating preconceived,
simplistic, experimenter generated dimensions of imagery measured by the
available questionnaires.
Phenomenological Method
In the present research, phenomenological method was employed as a
preliminary step in the development of a self-report measure of visual imagery.
Phenomenological method provides a standardized procedure for obtaining
reports of conscious experience. This information can serve as the basis for a
questionnaire that assesses the experience of visual imagery and can be used to
study visual imagery in relation to task performance.
Giorgi (1985) has delineated a phenomenological procedure by which to
obtain descriptions of phenomena that most accurately reflect human
experience. The phenomenological method used in the proposed research was
a variation of the procedure explicated by Giorgi (1985). A brief description
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of the steps outlined by Giorgi (1985) is helpful in gaining a clearer
understanding of the modification in procedure. The participant is asked to
write a description of an experience. The request or instructions are asked by
the experimenter in such a way as to make the least number of presuppositions
about the phenomenon of interest as possible (Colaizzi, 1878). Therefore, the
content of instructions or questions asked by the researcher range from general
to specific.
After a description is obtained, the researcher reads the description for
an intuitive feel for the gist (Giorgi, 1985). The protocol is broken down into
meaning units. Then, the meaning units are grouped into individualized
themes of meaning. This step involves taking the themes and transforming
them into a psychological language. In this transformation, the details of
situational context are omitted and a reflection of the individualized themes as
the researcher perceives them are included.
These themes are combined into an individual description. This
description is given to the participant and he/she is asked to modify the content
of the description wherever necessary to best reflect the meaning of the
experience as perceived by the individual. The researcher combines the
individual descriptions of all subjects into one general description that centers
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around the elements that are common to all participants.
Variations on this procedure were employed in the present study. In
the method outlined by Giorgi (1985) the individual description provides
information that reflects the individual differences between subjects, but the
general description reflects components of the experience that are common to
everyone. For the purpose of the proposed research, results from the
phenomenological analysis must reflect individual differences; therefore, the
development of the individual description was the final step in the present
procedure.
Phenomenological method is based upon Husserl’s (1925/1977)
conception of meaning, and is concerned with the extent to which the resulting
description accurately reflects the meaning of the phenomenon as experienced
by the subject. In the present research, however, the description is related to a
cognitive process that does not have meaning in the same way that experiences
such as guilt, anxiety, and victimization have meaning. Consequently, instead
of extracting themes of meaning from the individual descriptions, the
researcher extracted phrases that conveyed information relevant to the
experience of imagery and developed a more concise description from these
items. Also, the participant judged the degree to which the description
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reflected accurately the phenomenal experience of the participant and made
clarifications or changes in the description to best reflect his/her experience.
In addition to following the steps of phenomenological method as
delineated by Giorgi (1985), a procedure based on Kelly’s (1955) theory of
personal constructs was used to obtain information about the description from
the participants’ perspective. Kelly (1955) assumes that individuals construe
their world in terms of dichotomous constructs. Individuals are thought to
perceive similarities and differences among significant others in relationship to
a particular construct.
Participants followed a procedure based upon Kelly’s (1955) theory in
which they compared their own descriptions to the descriptions of others within
their own task condition. Participants told the experimenter how their
description was similar to or different from the descriptions of other subjects to
provide additional information about the experience of imagery from the
participant’s point of view.
Hypotheses
The purpose of the present research was to use a variation of
phenomenological method in order to obtain items that describe the structure
and function of imagery as experienced by individuals when performing a
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memory or problem-solving task. These items, along with other self-report
data derived from Kelly’s (1955) theory of personal constructs, provided the
basis for a questionnaire assessing the conscious experience of imagery. In
accordance with KaufmamTs (1981, 1983) suggestion, a within-subjects design
was employed. It was expected that the structure of the experience of imagery
would differ depending upon whether imagery was experienced within a
memory or problem-solving context, and that this difference would contribute
to two distinct factor structures of imagery for memory and problem-solving.
Study 1
Method
Subjects
Participants were 24 males and 24 females fulfilling a research
requirement for an introductory psychology course.
Procedure
Session 1. Participants attended two sessions. In session 1, participants
performed either a memory task (Paivio, 1971) or a problem solving task
(Hayes & Simon, 1974, 1977; Kotovsky, Hayes, & Simon, 1985). The
procedure for the memory task condition, was based on Paivio’s (1971) pairedassociate learning paradigm. Twenty pairs of concrete nouns were presented to
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subjects on a screen using a slide projector at a rate of 10 seconds per noun
pair (see Appendix A). After viewing all pairs, subjects were presented with
14 of the 20 words and wrote the word they believed to be associated with the
presented word.
Concrete nouns were used to maximize the spontaneous use of imagery.
Although not all subjects spontaneously use imagery during memory tasks,
subjects have been found to use imagery more often when remembering
concrete nouns rather than abstract nouns and when free recall rather than
serial recall is requested (Paivio, 1971). Therefore, the use of concrete nouns
increased the probability that imagery was used while creating an unstructured
environment in that the researcher did not provide a strategy for remembering
the noun-pairs.
Immediately upon completion of the memory task, participants wrote a
description of their internal experience of imagery during the memory task.
The following instructions were provided to the participants who completed the
questions in a specified order. The instructions were arranged from general
and unstructured to specific and structured in accordance with Colaizzi’s (1978)
recommendation. This procedure minimized the extent to which a structure
was imposed upon the participants’ experience.
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(Page 1) Please write a description of how you went about
remembering the noun-pairs. (Page 2) If you used images in your head
to complete the task, describe the qualities of the image itself and the
way you used the images. (Page 3) If you used other strategies, such
as verbal repetition, please describe the strategy, and indicate
specifically how you used the strategy.
If participants reported having the experience of mental images, but failed to
elaborate on the quality of the images, the researcher prompted the participant
by asking, HCan you tell me about your images?"
After completing the description, the researcher identified the essential
components of the description. A typical description written by a participant
follows:
An association was formed between the two words and was represented
as a visual image. The objects interacted together in some way. The
images came to mind without conscious effort. Some depicted usual
interactions but most would be unusual if found in everyday life. The
images were similar to simple drawings, lacking in detail. The pictures
were very clear and looked like crayon drawings in their simplicity and
color.
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The following components were identified by the researcher: objects interacted
together, produced without conscious effort, some usual interactions, most
unusual interactions, similar to drawings, simple, lacking in detail, very clear,
like crayon drawings, color. The researcher developed a description from the
identified components. The final individual description based upon the
elements listed above follows:
Your images were of objects which interacted together in some way.
Some of the interactions were unusual but others were more usual
interactions. Your images were clear and were produced without
conscious effort. They were similar to crayon drawings, simple, lacked
detail, and consisted of color.
The participant assessed the extent to which the description accurately reflected
his/her experience of imagery during the memory task and, if necessary,
modified the description to best reflect the participant’s experience of imagery.
In the problem-solving condition, participants solved the Monster
Problem adapted from the Tower of Hanoi problems (Hayes & Simon, 1974,
1977; Kotovsky, Hayes, & Simon, 1985). The Monster Problem is
unstructured with respect to processing style or strategy and can be solved by
using verbal, written statements, or imaginal processes (see Appendix B).
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Participants were given 15 minutes to solve the problem. The mean time of
completion is approximately 13-14 minutes (Kotovsky, Hayes, and Simon,
1985).
Upon completion of the Monster Problem, participants wrote a
description of their experience of imagery or other processes they used to solve
the problem according to the following instructions. Again, the directions
were ordered from general to specific.
(Page 1) Please write a description of how you solved this problem.
(Page 2) If you used images in your head to complete the task,
describe the qualities of the image itself and the way you used the
images. (Page 3) If you used other strategies such as words and
sentences, describe specifically how you used them to solve the
problem.
If participants reported having the experience of mental images, but
failed to elaborate on the quality of the images, the researcher prompted the
participant by asking, "Can you tell me about your images?" Then, the
researcher identified the essential components of the description. A typical
description obtained from participants is as follows:
As the problem was read, color images of objects in the problem were
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formed. But in order to set up the problem, complex images were
abandoned including color and detailed images. Letters were drawn on
paper to represent objects in the problem. Potential moves were
visualized using mental images in which balls that were pictured as two
dimensional objects were being transferred. Size of objects were
remembered by position in the mental picture rather than proportionally
sized objects. Transfers that took place within the images were similar
to static before and after pictures with no actual movement being seen.
Then the transfer was recorded onto paper using letters and arrows as a
check on the feasibility of the transfers made using mental pictures.
The following components were identified by the researcher to be included in
the questionnaire: color, complex images abandoned, two-dimensional, size of
objects were remembered by location rather than proportionally sized objects,
static before and after pictures. The description based upon the components
listed above follows:
Your images were complex and consisted of detail and color. These
complex images were abandoned as the task progressed. Objects in
your images were two-dimensional and the relative sizes of objects was
remembered by their location in your mental picture, rather than
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visualizing the objects true to their relative sizes. Movement in your
images was represented by static, before and after pictures instead of
visualizing moving objects within the image.
The participant assessed the degree to which the description accurately reflected
his/her experience of imagery, and modified the description if necessary.
Specific questions related to vividness and control of imagery were
asked last in the procedure to minimize the extent to which these questions may
structure the subjects’ responses. To assess vividness, participants were asked
if they were aware of the vividness of their images during the task. Control of
images was assessed by asking subjects if they were aware of controlling or
manipulating images in their heads. If vividness and control were reported to
be part of the experience of imagery, they were included in the development of
the imagery questionnaire.
Session 2. In order to encourage participants to make fine distinctions
among different types of strategies or cognitive processes, the descriptions
were labeled by two independent raters before session two according to one of
three processing strategies: imaginal processing, verbal processing, or a
combination of imaginal and verbal processing. Interrater reliability was 79
percent. Discrepancies were resolved through discussion.
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Each subject read the descriptions of all three groups belonging to his
or her own condition, either memory or problem-solving. Order of group
presentation was counterbalanced. Then, subjects reported the ways in which
the descriptions within each of the three categories were similar to and
different from one another. The items obtained from the participants were
included in the development of the imagery scale.
Results
In response to the first unstructured question concerning strategy,
participants reported the use of all three categories of strategies, i.e., imagery,
verbal, and a combination of imagery and verbal, during both memory and
problem-solving tasks. Participants reported a total of 31 items that reflected
their experience when performing the memory task and 15 items that described
their experience during the problem-solving task (see appendix C). Except for
one item, items obtained for the problem-solving task overlapped with the
items obtained from participants in the memory condition. This item was,
"Mental pictures of geometric shapes were used as symbols to represent lifelike
objects".
Vividness was reported spontaneously by a few subjects, however,
control of images was not spontaneously reported. Furthermore, participants
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failed to distinguish between control of images and movement within images in
response to the structured question about control. This lack of distinction was
indicated by the typical response to the control question that participants "made
things move around".
Study 2
Method
Subjects
Participants were 52 males and 51 females who were fulfilling a
research requirement for an introductory psychology course and volunteers
from an undergraduate statistics course in the department of psychology.
Measures
Items obtained from the individual descriptions, similarity and
difference items, and answers to the vividness question were transformed into a
questionnaire. The wording of items in the questionnaire was as identical as
possible to the wording used by participants when describing their experience
of imagery. The phrasing of some items was changed to facilitate a clear
understanding of the items. For example, "size of objects were remembered
by position in the mental picture rather than proportional sizes" was changed
to, "How often did you remember the relative sizes of objects by their location
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(i.e. left, middle, right) in your mental picture, rather than visualizing the
objects true to their relative sizes?" Most items contained the same words used
by the participants in describing their experience of imagery.

Because

students failed to distinguish between control of images and movement, only
the item of movement was retained in the questionnaire.

The questionnaire

contained 46 items and responses were reported on a 1 to 7 scale (see
Appendix C).
Order of items in the questionnaire was random. Some questions were
phrased in two ways reflecting either a frequency or a qualitative assessment of
the participants’ experience to determine if subjects made distinctions among
these items in their experience. For example, item one concerning color was
phrased, "How often do your images consist of color?".

Item 12, which also

assessed color, was worded, "To what degree do your images consist of
color?". It was thought that the phrasing of these questions may reveal
distinctions in the way participants relate their experience. Instead of deciding
a priori to include only one phrasing, it was decided to obtain data from the
participants as to the relationship between these two types of wordings in the
subjective report of imagery.
Procedure
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The design was a within-subjects design in accordance with Kaufmann’s
(1981, 1983) recommendation. Participants attended two 30- minute sessions
during which they completed either a paired-associate learning task or solved
the Monster Problem according to the instructions in Study 1. Ten to 20
participants attended each session. Order of task was counterbalanced across
subjects. Upon completion of each task, participants completed the
questionnaire developed from Study 1. The sessions were separated by at least
5 days to minimize carry over effects from the first task, and to minimize the
extent to which participants would remember their previous responses and
attempt to maintain consistency in responding to the questionnaire.
Results
Pearson product moment correlations were performed on items across
both tasks to assess the relationship between items that had been phrased in two
ways to reflect frequency of occurrence and quality of images. The results
revealed that participants’ responses to these items were highly correlated (see
Table 1), indicating that participants perceived these items to be asking the
same question. Consequently, a mean score was calculated for each pair of
questions and the means of these variables were included in the factor analyses.
Because of the high number of variables relative to number of subjects,
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a criterion for eliminating variables for the factor analysis was employed.
Variables that were highly skewed and failed to discriminate among subjects as
indicated by standard deviations less than 1.50 were not included in the final
analyses. Also, two questions were discarded because of unclear phrasing
which may have contributed to participants’ confusion about how to answer the
questions, and four questions related to verbal processes were discarded. A
total of 20 variables were retained.
Principal component analyses were performed to identify the number of
factors to be specified for factor analyses. Results revealed three eigenvalues
greater than 1.0 for the problem-solving condition and two eigenvalues greater
than 1.0 for the memory condition using Kaiser’s (see Dillon & Goldstein,
1984) method of factor extraction. These structures were confirmed by the
examination of scree tests for each factor structure.
Principal axis factor analyses with oblique rotation were performed to
determine the dimensions of imagery that are indicative of memory processes
and one to determine the dimensions of imagery that are involved in problem
solving. Oblique rotations were performed because this rotation technique
allows variables to correlate freely, and therefore, the technique reflects the
relationships among variables as they most likely exist in reality. Analyses
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revealed different structures for imagery depending upon whether imagery was
used to perform a memory or problem-solving task (see Tables 2 and 3).
Items with a factor loading of .35 or greater was retained in the factor
structure.
Order effects were examined using multivariate analyses of variance for
both memory and problem-solving tasks (see Tables 4 and 5). A 2(Gender) x
2(Order) multivariate analysis of variance performed for the memory task with
Factor One and Factor Two as dependent variables revealed a Gender by Order
interaction, F(2, 98)= 3.03, p < .053. Univariate analyses showed an effect
for Factor One, F(l, 99) = 5.98, p < .016. Tukey mean comparisons
indicated that if females performed the problem-solving task first, they
obtained higher Factor One scores for memory than males, F(2, 101) = 5.04,
p < .05. When females and males performed the memory task first, the
difference between scores obtained on Factor One for males and females was
nonsignificant.
A 2(Gender) x 2(Order) manova for problem-solving with factors one,
two, and three as dependent variables showed a gender x order interaction,
F(3, 94) = 3.69, p < .015. Univariate analyses revealed an interaction for
Factor One, F (l, 96) = 7.97, p < .006. Tukey mean comparisons indicated
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that females who completed the memory task first scored lower on Factor one
than males who performed the memory task first, F(l, 99) = 18,65, g < .01.
Also, females scored lower on Factor One when the memory task was
performed first than when the problem-solving task was completed first, F(l,
99) = 12.68, g < .01. Differences between males and females on Factor One
when the problem-solving task was completed first were nonsignificant.
A main effect for gender was revealed, F(3, 94) = 6.05, g < .001.
Univariate analyses showed that males scored higher on Factor Two than
females, F(l, 96) = 6,83, g < .01. A main effect for order was found.
Univariate analyses indicated that individuals who performed the problem
solving task first obtained higher scores on Factor Three than participants who
performed the memory task first, F (l, 96) = 7.02, g < 009.
Discussion
A three-factor structure best reflected the experience of imagery in a
problem-solving task, whereas a two factor structure best described imagery as
experienced during performance of a memory task. Within the memory task
condition, the first factor reflected a complex structure that consisted of vivid,
clear, three-dimensional images that were reported to facilitate effective
thought about the task. The images were perceived to be real, colorful, and
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contained movement. These images were formed easily, were produced
without conscious effort, and increased in clarity as the task progressed. A
general label of Complex/Movement best describes the items which loaded
onto the first factor for the memory task.
The second factor, labeled Simple, was characterized by simple, twodimensional images that consisted of little context or background. Neither
movement nor static images loaded on this factor.
Factor one of the problem-solving condition was characterized by
complexity, vividness, and movement, and complex images were reported to
facilitate effective thinking about the problem. More specifically, images
contained a context or background, appeared real to the participants, and were
three-dimensional. These items reflect a Complex/Movement factor, similar to
the Complex/Movement factor of memory.
In contrast to the Complex/Movement factor, the second factor
consisted of simple, two-dimensional, static images, and participants reported
that they abandoned complex images formed earlier in the task in favor of
simple images which they used to complete the task. A label of Simple/Static
characterizes this second factor. Reports of complex images and threedimensional images loaded negatively on this factor indicating further the
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simple nature of the images. The extent to which participants reported using
images to perform the task obtained an equivalent factor loading for both
Complex/Movement and Simple/Static factors.
A finding that perhaps contradicts intuitive speculation on the nature of
images revealed that vividness loaded negatively on the Simple/Static factor.
At least when performing problem-solving tasks similar to the Monster
Problem, simple, static images are not as vivid as complex images which
contain movement.
Individuals experienced fuzzy images during problem-solving as
indicated by the positive loading of this item on a third factor, whereas
vividness and clarity loaded negatively on this factor. Other characteristics of
this Fuzzy factor revealed that images were not formed easily and complex
images were reported to inhibit effective thinking about the problem.
The factors discussed above reveal similarities between images that are
produced during a performance of a memory task and images formed during
problem-solving. Both experiences of imagery are characterized by a complex
factor and a simple factor. Movement contributes to the complex factor for
both memory and problem-solving tasks, and several other items are common
to the complex factors for both experiences of imagery.
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Although similarities in the two factor structures for memory and
problem-solving were obtained, differences between the two factor structures
indicate that images produced within memory and problem-solving contexts
may not be equivalent in structure and function. One obvious difference
between the two structures is the addition of a third factor of fuzziness within
the problem-solving task condition. Also, the fuzziness of images seems to
interact with the complexity of images for the problem-solving task. For
example, participants reported that complex images inhibited their ability to
think effectively about the Monster Problem.

Participants’ perceptions that

complex images inhibited their ability to think about the problem was an
indicator of the Fuzzy factor, suggesting that fuzzy, complex images were
perceived to inhibit the problem-solving process; however, clear, complex
images were reported to facilitate problem-solving. Reports of complex images
that inhibited effective task performance failed to load on a factor at all for the
memory condition. This finding suggests that level of complexity, whether
vivid or fuzzy, does not lead to individual’s perception of disruption of the
cognitive processes involved with memory, but the combination of complexity
and fuzziness leads to reports of disruption in thought for problem-solving.
Based upon this information, perhaps future researchers attempting to predict
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task performance would find that performance on problem-solving tasks is
impeded by the generation of fuzzy, complex images, but that the fuzziness of
images is not as important to performance on memory tasks, regardless of
image complexity.
Another difference between the factor structures revealed that static
images contributed to a Simple/Static factor structure for the problem-solving
task, but static images failed to contribute to the Simple factor for the memory
task. Also, images contained a context or background when experienced
within a problem-solving task, but this item did not characterize images formed
when performing a memory task.
Bizarre imagery loaded on the complex factor for both memory and
problem-solving conditions. This result supports Paivio’s (1971) finding that
bizarre imagery is useful when performing memory tasks. Most likely, the
loading of bizarre images onto the factor structure for problem-solving was an
artifact of the type of problem presented to the participants. Participants
indicated in Study One that their images often consisted of monsters passing
globes to one another until this strategy became too difficult to maintain;
therefore, images containing representations of this type probably accounted for
the loading of this item on the factor structure obtained for problem-solving.
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An important difference between the two experiences of imagery was
revealed by the loading of "ease of constructing an image" on the complex
factors of both memory and problem-solving, but the failure of this item to
contribute to the Simple factor for memory. Based upon the present results,
simpler images are not associated with easier production of the image, and a
more complex image is easier to produce regardless of the task. This finding
together with participants’ reports that complex images inhibit effective
thinking while solving a problem provides insight into the difference between
the ability to produce a complex image with ease and the dysfunctional nature
of that same image depending upon the task demands. The image that is easily
formed may not be the most functional image during cognitive processing.
This finding that an easily formed complex image may inhibit problem-solving
is based upon participants’ perceptions of the degree to which complex images
inhibit problem-solving; therefore, after this result is confirmed using another
sample of participants, researchers should examine the extent to which
participants’ perceptions of the relationship between easily formed, complex
images and effective thinking about a task generalize to the prediction of task
performance.
The results obtained for vividness and movement of images suggest that
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vividness and movement are experienced within a broader context of complex
images that are described as real, three-dimensional, and colorful. Vividness
failed to contribute to the Simple factor of memory. During the memory task,
movement was not associated with images that were void of context, simple,
and two-dimensional. Within the problem-solving task, simple and static
images loaded together, and neither vividness nor movement loaded on the
Simple/Static factor. This pattern of loadings indicates that vividness and
movement are co-occurring dimensions within a "complex” factor.
The vividness of movement within images is currently being
investigated using the Vividness of Movement Imagery Questionnaire (VMIQ),
a scale developed by Marks and his colleagues (Isaac, Marks, & Russell,
1986); however, the VMIQ measures only the vividness and movement of
imagery to the exclusion of other qualities of imagery that may interact in ways
crucial to describing the complex experience of mental imagery. This
speculation is supported by the present results that suggest both vividness and
control may be included under a more general factor of complexity that
includes vividness, movement, context, and three-dimensional images.
Generally, the present results provide support for the hypothesis that the
experiences of imagery within a memory task condition and a problem-solving
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task condition differ qualitatively. After the present factor structure is
confirmed using confirmatory analyses on data collected from another set of
participants, the extent to which these dimensions are predictive of
performance will be examined. Also, the present factor structure may
generalize to other tasks similar in cognitive processing demands.
Although the factors obtained in the present study that distinguished
among these two imagery experiences accounted for a significant amount of
variability in participants’ experience, a large amount of variance remains
unexplained. Some of this variability may be explained in terms of verbal
strategies that participants reported in the present research. Verbal strategies
such as talking to oneself, using short phrases and sentences to form
meaningful relationships among objects were reported in the present research.
A combination of verbal and imaginal strategies were used by participants such
as talking silently to oneself while trying to construct a mental image or
beginning with a verbal strategy and switching to an imaginal strategy. Among
those individuals who used a verbal strategy to encode information during the
memory task, several reported the use of auditory imagery as indicated by item
43 in the questionnaire.
Although these results contribute to an understanding of the different
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ways in which individuals solve problems and remember information, the
purpose of the present research was to investigate the complex experience of
imagery without constraining the responses given by the participants when
conveying their experience, and therefore, participants were encouraged to
describe all of the strategies they used, whether verbal or imaginal. Future
researchers should seek other qualitative differences that account for the
remaining amounts of variance related to additional components of the
experience of imagery within memory and problem-solving tasks.
The present results were obtained using a within-subjects design as
suggested by Kaufmann (1981, 1983); however, interpretation of the results
may be constrained by order and gender effects that accompanied the withinsubjects design. Order effects were obtained for the fuzzy factor of problem
solving, as well as two gender by order interaction effects for the
Complex/Movement factors of memory and problem-solving. A time-delay
between the two sessions was included as a precaution against the tendency of
participants' to maintain consistency between their responses in the two
sessions, and order effects were controlled experimentally by counterbalancing
tasks across participants. If researchers agree with Kaufmann’s (1981, 1983)
argument that a within-subjects design is superior to a between-subjects design
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when measuring individuals’ self-reports of an internal experience using Likerttype scales, order effects that occur as a result of this design will have to be
accounted for, or precautions in addition to those included in the present
research will have to be taken to eliminate order effects. A possibility exists,
however, that these effects may convey information that goes beyond a
contribution to procedural refinement. Although order and gender effects
obtained from one study may not generalize to other research findings, the
experience of engaging in a problem-solving task may have implications in
general for the type of cognitive mediators used to complete subsequent
memory tasks. If a consistent pattern of order effects is obtained in future
research, the cognitive processes that mediate these effects would be worthy of
empirical inquiry.
Individual difference variables other than gender should be investigated
in relation to imagery in future research to determine their effect on the
qualitative experience of imagery. Individual differences in verbal and
nonverbal ability could be expected to mediate the influence of task demand.
Individual difference variables have been included in only a few investigations
Parrot & Strongman, 1985; Kaufmann, 1981) and within these studies
researchers failed to distinguish between nonverbal and verbal ability and a
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composite IQ score. According to Richardson (1977), individuals possess
different cognitive style dimensions ranging on a continuum from being a
verbalizer to being a visualizer, and he has developed a scale to assess these
cognitive style dimensions. Furthermore, Kaufmann (1983) has emphasized
the importance of including cognitive ability measures in the assessment of
imagery. Given the lack of research on individual differences in cognitive
ability in relation to the cognitive representation used to perform various tasks,
it is important to measure these individual differences when comparing the
experience of imagery in memory and problem-solving contexts to determine
their effect on the experience of imagery.
Alternative methodologies that contribute to a deeper understanding and
reflect the complexity of internal experience is essential to a complete
assessment of the experience of imagery. Although phenomenological method
has been used primarily within other contexts to assess the meaningfulness of
experiences such as loneliness, anxiety, and self-deception, the present study
demonstrated the usefulness of phenomenological method in identifying
complex, multidimensional qualities of imagery. An empirical investigation of
a phenomenon such as imagery should not originate with experimenter
preconceptions as to the qualities of imagery that are most salient and
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important to individuals when engaging in various cognitive tasks. Only by
asking individuals to introspect upon their experiences in a standardized
manner can the complexity of imaginal processes be revealed.
The usefulness of self-reports on qualities of conscious experience to
the prediction of performance depends on the accuracy with which these
qualities are assessed, not on their ability to explain underlying causal
mechanisms. It is not assumed, at least by the present authors, that self-report
measures can explain by themselves the neural or cognitive mechanisms that
mediate imagery; nevertheless, knowledge obtained about the conscious
experience of imagery may provide clues as to the underlying mechanisms
involved.
Individuals should be allowed to introspect upon their own imaginal
experiences related to the performance of spatial ability tasks and imagery
ability tasks and to convey their experiences by self-report in order to
complement performance data. It seems that this procedure would be a more
direct route of description than an imposition of the researcher’s interpretation
of the behavior. Rather than proceeding under experimenter inferences alone,
the subjective reporting of imaginal experiences may be at least as equally
valid and a more direct method for the study of imagery. To the extent that
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self-report measures are developed using rigorous procedures for collecting
qualitative data, appropriate methodological procedures, and the experiences
are examined without the constraint of experimenter preconceptions, these
measures may reflect the experiences of individuals more accurately.
Questionnaires based on introspective data obtained using improved procedures
may provide more valid self-report measures that correspond to performance
measures.
A legitimate complaint regarding the limitations of current
investigations of imagery lies within the restrictive nature of the laboratory
setting itself. Yuille (1985) emphasizes that experimenters destroy the
phenomenon under investigation by bringing it into the laboratory and placing
situational restrictions in terms of specified tasks and artificial contexts that
constrain the responses of participants. He asserts that the experimental
environment isolates a phenomenon from its naturally occurring context and
this disregard for the context of cognitive processing creates a situation in
which "Both the experimenter and subject are victims of a shared belief system
which permits hypothesis confirmation without knowledge generation" (Yuille,
1985, p. 142).
Researchers need to venture outside of the laboratory and to understand
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the usefulness of imagery to everyday living, how imagery relates to memory
for everyday events, to autobiographical memory, and to everyday reasoning.
As Yuille (1985) emphasizes, the loss in precision will be worth the benefit of
more meaningful, contextual research. Although the qualities of imagery as
experienced in our everyday lives provides an important source of information
concerning the experience of imagery, the laboratory environment provides a
setting for obtaining knowledge of more formal cognitive processes such as
analytical or logical reasoning in terms of syllogisms, or explicitly specified
memory tasks. Consequently, neither source of inquiry should be excluded in
favor of the other and improved self-report measures that reflect the
complexity of human experience should be employed in the investigation of
imagery regardless of the nature of the research setting.
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Table 1
Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Items Phrased in Terms of Frequency and
Degree

Task

Item

Memory

Problem-solving

Color

.74

.90

Complex/detail

.81

.85

Clear

.70

.61

Vivid

.80

.84

Fuzzy

.69

.75

Simple

.73

.78

Bright

.85

.82

Note: All correlations significant at p < .001.
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Table 2
Factor Structure and Item Loadings for Memory Condition
Factors
Item

Complex/Movement

Simple

Use images to perform task

.84

Vivid

.77

Clear

.76

Ease of forming image

.70

Image produced without conscious effort

.59

Three-dimensional

.56

Bizzare

.55

Complex images facilitated effective thinking

.55

-.62

Complex

.54

-.68

Color

.50

Images increased in clarity as task progressed

.43

Real

.38

Movement

.36

Fuzzy

-.39

-.44

Abandoned complex images for simple images

.74

Simple

.72

Two-dimensional

.33
-.36

Images consisted of context or background
Eigenvalue

5.59

1.52

% Variance

28.00

7.60
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Table 3
Factor Structure and Item Loadings for Problem-Solving Condition
Factors
Item

Complex/Movement

Vivid

.83

Complex

.82

Complex images facilitated effective thinking

.79

Images consisted of context or background

.72

Real

.71

Color

.68

Three-dimensional

.60

Clear

.58

Images produced without conscious effort

.56

Images increased in clarity as task progressed

.55

Ease of forming image

.47

Used images to perform task

.45

Movement

.40

Bizarre

.37

Simple

-.35

Simple/Static

Fuzzy
-.35

-.42
-.39

-.40
-.59

-.46
.45

.69

Static

.60

Two-dimensional

.49

Abandoned complex images for simple images

.41

Fuzzy

.60

Complex images inhibited effective thinking

.41

Eigenvalue

6.17

1.92

1.01

% Variance

30.90

9.60

5.10
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Table 4

Condition

Factors
Complex/Movement

Simple

Memory First
Male

4.81

4.62

Female

4.50

4.45

Male

4.43

4.35

Female

5.04

4.55

Problem First

Imagery, memory, and

64
Table 5
Factor Mean Scores for Problem-Solving as a Function of Gender and Order
Factors

Condition
Complex/Movement

Simple

Fuzzy

Memory First
Male

3.93

3.91

3.44

Female

2.67

3.68

3.50

Male

3.60

4.21

3.73

Female

3.65

3.84

4.10

Problem First
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Appendix A
Noun-pairs
horse

tree

clock

pencil

star

house

spoon

window

elephant

gun

truck

nut

cup

tongue

hammer

bottle

pipe

gate

flat

lion

diamond

bird

arrow

umbrella

garden

money

apple

flower

piano

snake

lobster

cigar

watch

radio

bun

shoe

table

dollar

skin

butter
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Appendix B
The Monster Problem
Three five-handed extra-terrestrial monsters were holding three crystal
globes. Because of the quantum-mechanical peculiarities of their
neighborhood, both monsters and globes come in exactly three sizes with no
others permitted: small, medium, and large. The small monster was holding
the large globe; the medium-sized monster was holding the small globe, and
the large monster was holding the medium-sized globe. Since this situation
offended their keenly developed sense of symmetry, they proceeded to transfer
globes from one monster to another so that each monster would have a globe
proportionate to its own size. Monster etiquette complicated the solution of the
problem since it requires that:
1. Only one globe may be transferred at a time;
2. If a monster is holding two globes, only the larger of the two may be
transferred;
3. A globe may not be transferred to a monster who is holding a larger globe.

By what sequence of transfers could the monsters have solved this problem?
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Appendix C
Imagery Questionnaire
1. How often did your images consist of color?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

2. How similar were your images to a pencil sketch?
Not at all
1

Somewhat similar
2

3

4

5

Extremely similar
6

7

3. How often did your images consist of isolated objects, without context or
background?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

4. How often did you experience movement of objects in your mental images?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

5. How often were your images 2 dimensional?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7
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6. How often were your images realistic?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

7. How often were your images complex and detailed?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

8. How clear were your images?
Not at all
1

Somewhat clear
2

3

4

5

Extremely clear
6

7

9. How often did detailed, complex images inhibit thinking about the task
(i.e.perhaps because they contained too much irrelevant information)?
Never inhibited
1

2

Sometimes inhibited
3

4

5

6

Always inhibited
7

10. How often did complex detailed images facilitate effective thinking about
the task?
Never facilitated
1

2

Sometimes facilitated
3

4

5

6

Always facilitated
7

Imagery, memory, and

69
11. How often did you abandon usage of complex, detailed images in favor of
simpler images throughout the task?
Never abandoned
1

2

Sometimes abandoned
3

4

5

6

Always abandoned
7

12. To what degree were your images in color?
Not all
1

Somewhat colorful
2

3

4

5

6

Extremely colorful
7

13. How often did your images consist of static pictures of separate objects?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

14. How often were your images static pictures of objects interacting in a way
that only implied motion (i.e. one object acting upon or interacting with
another in a still picture)?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

15. How similar were your images to a camera shot/snapshot?
Not at all
1

Somewhat similar
2

3

4

5

6

Extremely similar
7
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16. How often did your images contain a context or background?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

Extremely often

5

6

7

17. How similar was movement in your images to a panning effect (i.e. like
an aerial scanning)?
Not at all
1

Somewhat similar
2

3

4

Extremely similar

5

6

7

18. How often did your images contain unusual or bizarre interactions of
objects that are not found in everyday life?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

19. How often did you experience vivid images?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

20. How similar were your images to the experience of watching television?
Not at all
1

Somewhat similar
2

3

4

5

6

Extremely similar
7
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21. How often did you use conscious effort to intentionally develop a mental
image?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

22. To what degree were your images complex and detailed?
Not at all
1

Somewhat detailed
2

3

4

5

6

Extremely detailed
7

23. How often did your images resemble static, before and after pictures?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

24. How vivid were your images?
Not at all
1

Somewhat vivid
2

3

4

5

Extremely vivid
6

7

25. How often were your images 3 dimensional?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

26. How bright were your images?
Not at all
1

Somewhat bright
2

3

4

5

Extremely bright
6

7
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27. How often did you talk silently to yourself in order to help you to
perform the task?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

28. How often were your images easily formed?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

29. How often were your images simple and lacking in detail?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

30. How often were your images in black and white?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

31. How similar were your images to a crayon drawing?
Not at all
1

Somewhat similar
2

3

4

5

6

Extremely similar
7
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32. How often were your images a mental picture of the stimulus presented to
you rather than original images?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

33. How often did your images consist of geometric shapes that were symbols
to represent other objects?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

34. How often did you experience clear images?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

35. How often did you use images to help you to perform the task?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

36. To what degree did your images increase in clarity as the task progressed?
Not at all
1

Somewhat increased
2

3

4

5

6

Extremely increased
7
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37. How fuzzy were your images?
Not at all
1

Somewhat fuzzy
2

3

4

5

Extremely fuzzy
6

7

38. How often did you form a conceptual relationship without making a
sentence?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

39. How often did you remember the relative sizes of objects by their location
(i.e. left, middle, right) in your mental picture, rather than visualizing the
objects true to their relative sizes?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

40. How often did you experience bright images?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

41. How often did you use short phrases or sentences to form a meaningful
relationship among objects?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7
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42. How often did you experience fuzzy images?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

43. How often did remembering how the word sounds when saying it to
yourself (i.e. memory for an auditory sensation) help you to perform the task?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

44. How often did you talk silently to yourself while trying to construct a
mental image?
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

45. How often did you experience movement within your images during
presentation of the task, but static images during performing the task.
Never
1

Somewhat often
2

3

4

5

Extremely often
6

7

46. To what degree were your images simple and lacking in detail?
Not at all
1

Soroewhal simple
2

£

4

5

Extremely simple
6

7
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